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Abstract
This Comment contextualizes the issue of polygamous marriages
within the South African constitutional paradigm, one committed
unequivocally to the principle of equality. This Comment analyzes how
South African law, European in origin, had to incorporate the laws and
institutions of indigenous communities within the national legal
framework, as part of the overall transformative legal project underway in
the country since 1994. By focusing on the Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act, this Comment examines such incorporation, while
questioning its effect on the overall project of constitutionalism, human
rights, and equality.
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L Introduction
This Comment will examine customary marriages, mostly polygamous,
within the South African legal framework. In particular, this Comment will
focus on the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act,' a statute that purports
to regulate customary marriages, including the establishment of such marriages,
as well as their termination.
This Comment will contextualize the recognition of customary marriages
within the broader democracy project in South Africa, especially the legal and
constitutional transformation underway since the first democratic election in
1994. This Comment analyzes how the South African political and legal
context had to shift from its anomalous status, as a European colony at the tip
of the African continent, to a democratic African state, as a member of the
wider community of African states.2 Part of this paradigmatic shift included a
somewhat ambiguous undertaking of incorporating the laws and institutions of
indigenous communities within the national legal framework, while embarking
on a purposive (modernist) project of constitutionalism and human rights.
The European legal tradition, embodied in British and Roman-Dutch legal
principles, processes, and institutions, has long been the mainstay of the South
African legal system, with customary African law serving as the "stepchild" of
the national legal framework.4 However, the Constitution adopted in 1993, and
later in 1996, reflected a compromise that brought indigenous law into the
national legal framework.5 Although equality is the preeminent principle in the
1. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.).
2. See ALLISTER SPARKS, TOMORROW iS ANOTHER COUNTRY 5-14 (1995) (describing how
the political and legal shift in South Africa impacted that country's relationship with other
African states).
3. See Victoria Bronstein, Reconceptualising the Customary Law Debate in South
Africa, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 388, 388-89 (1998) (discussing the balance of cultural rights
and equality within the South African Constitution); Yvonne Mokgoro, Traditional Authority
and Democracy in the Interim South African Constitution, 3 REv. CONST. STUD. 60,60 (1996)
("The issue of continued recognition and protection of the institution of traditional leadership
and the role it will play in post-apartheid society was placed squarely on the agenda for
constitutional reform in South Africa.").
4. See generally T.W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA (2004); MARTIN
CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE 1902-1936: FEAR, FAVOUR AND
PREJUDICE (2001).
5. South Africa drafted its Constitution in two stages. See HAssEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL
OF A NATION: CONSTrrUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA 149-221 (1998) (discussing the
constitutional drafting process). The first stage, an interim constitution, was finalized in 1993.
Id. at 170. The second and final Constitution was adopted in 1996. Id at 189. For further
analysis of the South African Constitution, see generally THE POST-APARTHEID CONSTrrUTIONS:
REFLECTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BASIC LAW (Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds.,
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Bill of Rights-which provides that a law or policy contradicting such principle
be deemed unconstitutional 6 -the Constitution also provides for the recognition
of customary laws and institutions.7
This finely tuned constitutional compromise occurred against the backdrop
of several decades of global human rights debates centering on a woman's right to
equality, on the one hand, and the respect for cultural values and traditions on the
other. Loosely termed the "universalism versus cultural relativism"8 debate, the
essence of this discussion was the apparent contradiction between two liberatory
discourses, namely feminism and national liberation-the latter incorporating the
principle of self-determination for indigenous peoples.9 Feminist advocates and
legal scholars also influenced a fairly vigorous jurisprudence around equality,
advocating more for a substantive, as opposed to formal, equality.10 South Africa
was therefore in a unique position, as the last decolonized African country to
benefit not just from fifty years of global human rights activism, but also from the
lessons learned from other decolonized, particularly African, states."'
2001) and RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (David
Van Wyk et al. eds., 1994).
6. See S. AR. CONST. 1996 § 7(1) (declaring that the Bill of Rights "enshrines the rights
of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and
freedom").
7. See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 § l(ii) (S. Aft.) (defining
"customary law" as "the customs and usages traditionally observed among the indigenous
African peoples of South Africa and which form the culture of those peoples").
8. See Abdullahi A. An-Niim, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining
International Standards of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES
19, 22-29 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Ndim ed., 1992) (defining cultural relativity and cultural
universality).
9. See Abdullahi A. An-Ndim, Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 331, 339-45 (Abdullahi A. An-Naim & Francis M. Deng
eds., 1990) (examining the cultural relativism debate in the context of human rights); see also
RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 51-63 (1995) (criticizing
cultural relativism on grounds that it "preserves male privilege at the expense of women's
rights").
10. See Felicity Kaganas & Christina Murray, Law and Women's Rights in South Africa:
An Overview, in GENDER AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 1, 14-15 (Christina
Murray ed., 1994) (noting a preference for advocating substantive change over formal equality
among feminists seeking to eliminate women's disadvantages in society); see also Susan Bazilli,
Introduction to PUTTING WOMEN ON THE AGENDA 20 (Susan Bazilli ed., 1990) ("Formal equality
is worth little if it is not supplemented by affirmative action that will help to destroy the
structures and behavior patterns created by centuries of gender oppression, of discrimination
against women."); Sandra Liebenberg, Preface to THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A
GENDER PERSPECTIVE 6-7 (Sandra Liebenberg ed., 1995) (advocating for an approach that will
"assist academies, activists and lawyers as they seek to ensure that the final South African
Constitution offers women real tools of empowerment and not mere 'ropes of sand"').
11. See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBAUSM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S
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As the constitutional processes unfolded in South Africa, and as the
Constitutional Court developed significant women's rights jurisprudence, it
became increasingly clear that African women labored under a generally
subordinated legal status.' 2 African women were severely disadvantaged with
respect to issues such as inheritance, child custody, guardianship, and access to
property.' 3 The South African Law Commission therefore embarked on a
series of studies intended to address the disadvantages and discrimination of
women within an indigenous legal framework.14 One such study led to the
proposal of, and finally, the adoption of, the Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act.' 5 This Act defines "customary marriage" as "a marriage
concluded in accordance with customary law,' 6 and provides, inter alia, for the
following:
* the recognition of customary marriages;' 7
* the articulation of the requirements for a valid customary
marriage, including issues of consent;' 8
* the regulation of the registration of customary marriages;' 9
* the incorporation of equality, with respect to status and capacity,
to partners in customary mamages;
* the regulation of the proprietary consequences of customary
marriages;21 and
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 48-68 (2000) (describing the global community's impact on South
Africa's political transformation during the late twentieth century).
12. See H.J. SIMONS, AFRICAN WOMEN: THEIR LEGAL STATUS IN SOUTH AFRICA 271-77
(1968) (describing a work environment that subordinated the rights of African women).
13. See id. at 187-270 (describing the legal disadvantages confronting African women).
14. See S. AFRICAN LAW COMM'N, PROJECT 90, THE HARMONISATION OF THE COMMON
LAW AND THE INDIGENOUS LAW: REPORT ON CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES 1-7 (1998) (describing the
development and methodology of the Commission's study on customary marriages in South
Africa).
15. See S. AFRICAN LAW COMM'N, TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT (1998), http://www.
doj.gov.za/salrc/anr/1998_ar.pdf.
16. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. l(iii) (S. Aft.).
17. Id. s. 2.
18. Id.s. 3.
19. Id.s. 4.
20. Id. s. 6.
21. Id. s. 7.
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a the dissolution of customary marriages. 22
In addition to outlining the substantive provisions of the Act, this
Comment explains how these formal legal requirements impact the broader
issue of women's equality. In particular, this Comment examines the Act in
light of the various patterns of masculinities-a legacy of colonialism and
apartheid that continues to characterize post-apartheid South African
society23-and suggests ways that the polygamous arrangements permitted by
the Act may create conditions for greater equality for women. Conversely, this
Comment outlines the possible pitfalls of regulating a system that, despite its
protections, may not lead to the desired outcome of women's equality.24
II. The Constitution and Gender Equality
The South African Constitution embodies a clear commitment to gender
equality. The founding provisions emphasize the values that underpin South
Africa's democracy, including the principles of nonracialism and nonsexism. 25
Equality is the quintessential value, and the key provisions regarding gender
equality are found in the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights contains a general
commitment to equality before the law26 and to equal protection of the law,
27
declaring that "[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth., 28 The prohibition on
direct and indirect discrimination is an explicit recognition on the part of the
22. Id. s. 8.
23. See Penelope E. Andrews, Learning to Love After Learning to Harm: Post-Conflict
Reconstruction, Gender Equality and Cultural Values, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 41, 48 (2007)
(describing the pervasiveness of masculinity within the South African culture).
24. For a thoughtful discussion of the impact of the Recognition of Customary Marriages
Act, see Mothokoa Mamashela, New Families, New Property, New Laws: The Practical Effects
of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 616, 641 (2004)
(concluding that the progress made by the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act was more
illusory than real).
25. See, e.g., S. Ar. CONST. 1996 § 3(2) ("All citizens are equally entitled to the rights,
privileges and benefits of citizenship; and equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of
citizenship.").
26. See id. § 8(1) ("The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the
executive, and the judiciary, and all organs of state.").
27. See id. § 9(1) ("Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection
and benefit of the law.").
28. Id. § 9(3).
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constitutional drafters of the invidiousness and tenacity of institutionalized
discrimination. This recognition reflects legal and political trends in liberal
democracies where the principle of equality is centered in constitutional and
legislative arrangements, namely, that "[t]he inclusion of both sex and gender
as grounds for proscribing discrimination protects women from invidious
discrimination based not only on biological or physical attributes, but also on
social or cultural stereotypes about the perceived role and status of women."
29
The Bill of Rights explicitly acknowledges the intersectionality of
different grounds of discrimination.3 ° Such an acknowledgment is crucial to
redressing the discrimination confronted by black women who suffer multiple
forms of discrimination.3' In one of the earliest equality cases before the
Constitutional Court, Judge Goldstone noted that there is often a complex
relationship between specified grounds of discrimination, and that the
temptation to force them into neatly self-contained categories should be
resisted.32
An important provision in the Constitution, and one that potentially has
the ability to solidify the constitutional commitment to gender equality, is the
establishment of a Commission for Gender Equality,33 a body empowered to
promote, educate, monitor, and lobby for gender equality.34 The Constitution
29. Penelope E. Andrews, The Stepchild of National Liberation: Women and Rights in
the New South Africa, in THE POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5, at 326, 335. The
goals of nonsexism are promoted in other sections of the Bill of Rights not directly pertinent for
this discussion. These include the right to bodily security and integrity, including reproductive
rights. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 12(2) ("Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the
person, which includes the right to make decisions concerning reproduction; to security in and
control over their body; and not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without
their informed consent."). For an analysis of the constitutional commitment to equality, see
Andrews, supra at 326.
30. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(5) ("Discrimination on one or more of the grounds
listed ... is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.").
31. See Penelope E. Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights, and Critical Race
Feminism: Voices from the Margins, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373, 374-79 (2000)
(advocating an approach that considers all forms of discrimination); Adrien K. Wing & Eunice
P. de Carvalho, Black South African Women: Toward Equal Rights, 8 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 57,
60-61 (1995) (discussing the multiple forms of discrimination faced by black South African
women).
32. See President of the Republic of S. Africa v Hugo 1997(6) BCLR 708 (CC) at 729 (S.
Aft.) ("Each case ... will require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine whether its overall
impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of equality or not."). Judge Goldstone
further noted that "[a] classification which is unfair in one context may not necessarily be unfair
in a different context." Id.
33. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 187 (establishing the Commission for Gender Equality).
34. See id. § 187(1) (providing that the Commission "must promote respect for gender
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also provides for a Human Rights Commission to promote and protect human
rights. 35  The Bill of Rights is fairly expansive, incorporating generous
provisions relating to legal standing and, arguably, laying the basis for class
action litigation.36
The South African Constitution has been hailed as one of the most
impressive documents for the wide range of rights protections it affords 37 and
for its deep commitment, formally at least, to gender equality as evidenced by
the expansive provisions alluded to above.a It protects the civil and political
rights of women in all areas of life, including the public and private sphere.39
Most significantly, it provides for an array of social and economic rights that
equality and the protection, development and attainment of gender equality"); id. § 187(2)
(empowering the Commission to "monitor, investigate, research, educate, lobby, advise and
report on issues concerning gender equality").
35. Id. § 184; see also Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender
Equality in South Africa, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 307,330 (1998) (noting that the incorporation of
two human rights bodies in the Constitution, both ostensibly mandated to pursue equality,
engendered some controversy among women advocates in the early stages of the constitutional
drafting process). Those who supported a separate structure for women argued that only a
distinctly gendered institution could effectively pursue women's rights and deal
comprehensively with the eradication of sexism and patriarchy. Id. They feared that
incorporating women's concerns within a broader human rights structure would marginalize
women's issues and that the eradication of racism will take priority over the eradication of
sexism. Id. On the other hand, those who advocated for the inclusion of gender issues in a
broad human rights structure argued that women's issues are inevitably ghettoized when
separated and that, in any event, for most black women, their subordination flows from the
intersectionality of race, gender, class, and other indicators. Id. They also argue, compellingly
in the author's view, that it is important that a body like the Human Rights Commission develop
the capacity to fight women's subordination as part of a comprehensive and effective strategy to
combat all kinds of discrimination. Id. at 330-31.
36. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 38 (providing standing to bring claims for violations of
protections established under the Bill of Rights).
37. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S.
AFR. J. HuM. RTS. 146, 153 (1998) ("[The Constitution) intends not merely to proclaim
democratic political rights but to commit the South African people to achieve a new kind of
society in which people actually have the social resources they need meaningfully to exercise
their rights."); Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a
Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's Promise, 16
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 206, 211-12 (2000) ("South Africa is increasingly at the centre of the
transnational exchange of ideas and experience about the rule of law and human rights and, as
such, human rights scholars around the world can ill afford not to pay attention to developments
there.").
38. See Mark S. Kende, Gender Stereotypes in South Afrtican and American
Constitutional Law: The Advantages of a Pragmatic Approach to Equality and
Transformation, 117 S. AFR. L.J. 745,753 (2000) ("Unlike the South African Constitution, the
US Constitution doesn't expressly prohibit sex or gender discrimination.").
39. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 7-39 (enumerating a broad range of civil rights).
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could potentially reduce or eliminate the more egregious aspects of the legacy of
apartheid.40
The language in South Africa's Bill of Rights is particularly notable when
compared to the constitutional protection of gender equality in the United States.
The language suggests that discrimination against women is just as
constitutionally suspect as discrimination on the basis of race.41 This is no doubt
a firmer stance than the approach of the American courts, where gender
discrimination is subjected to intermediate scrutiny4 2 and race discrimination is
subjected to strict scrutiny.43
Since 1995, the Constitutional Court has had occasion to decide a
considerable number of equality cases, several involving gender equality claims.44
In these cases, the Court has elaborated at length about what equality means,
40. See Murray Wesson, Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-Economic
Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 284, 284
(2004) ("In 1996, South Africa took the bold step of including directly enforceable socio-
economic rights in its new Constitution."); see also Penelope E. Andrews, The South African
Constitution as a Mechanism for Redressing Poverty, in DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN AFRICA: ITS
IMPACT ON GOVERNANCE & POVERTY ALLEVIATION 57, 59-60 (Muna Ndulo ed., 2006)
(discussing the impact of social and economic rights established under the Constitution on
South Africa's poverty problem).
41. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(3) ("The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, [and] gender ....").
42. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("To withstand constitutional
challenge... classifications by gender must serve important governmental objects and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
43. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944) ("[A]ll legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect... [and] courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
44. See, e.g., Bhe & Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others 2003 (1) BCLR 27 (CC)
at 28-29 (S. Afr.) (finding unconstitutional intestate succession determinations based on the
principle of primogeniture); Minister ofDef v Potsane & Another 2001 (11) BCLR 1137 (CC)
at 1155 (S. Afr.) (finding unconstitutional the impugned powers of military prosecutors under
the Military Discipline Supplementary Act 16 of 1999); Hoffman v S. AfricaAirways 2000 (11)
BCLR 1211 (CC) at 1226 (S. Afr.) (finding an employer's refusal to hire an HIV positive
applicant unconstitutional); City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) at
290-91 (S. Afr.) (finding that government officials violated § 8(2) of the Interim Constitution
by charging a flat rate for municipal services to a historically black township while charging a
consumption-based rate to a historically white township); Fraser v Naude & Others 1998 (11)
BCLR 1357 (CC) at 1360-61 (S. Afr.) (denying an appeal brought by a father seeking to secure
his parental rights over a child born out of wedlock on grounds that it is not in the child's best
interest); President of the Republic ofS. Africa v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) at 745-46 (S.
Afr.) (finding that a statutory provision allowing the president to commute sentences of mothers
with small children, but not fathers in similar predicaments, constituted gender discrimination);
Brink v Kitshoff 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC) at 772-73 (S. Afr.) (striking down a statute which
deprived some married women of the right to insurance benefits ceded to them by their
husbands).
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attempting to contextualize structural disadvantage and discrimination within the
realities of contemporary South African society. In this endeavor, the Court has
furnished a more substantive definition of equality, eschewing a mere formalistic
one, focusing on disparate impact as opposed to equal treatment.45
III. The Constitution and Traditional Law
In addition to the gender equality provisions in the Bill of Rights, the
Constitution also protects traditional laws and institutions. Chapter 12 provides
for the recognition of, and role of, traditional leaders. In particular, this chapter
provides that "[t]he courts must apply customary law when that law is
applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals
with customary law. ''46 This section suggests that the principle of equality will
supersede any aspect of traditional law that violates that principle.47 Indeed, the
Constitutional Court has reiterated the supremacy of the principle of equality in
the face of an indigenous law that discriminated against women.48
Section 30 of the Bill of Rights states that "[e]veryone has the right to use
the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one
exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision
of the Bill of Rights. 49 Similarly, § 31 provides that persons "belonging to a
cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with
other members of the community to (a) enjoy their culture, practice their
religion and use their language; and (b) form, join and maintain cultural,
religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society. '50 These
45. See Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, Facing the Challenge of Transformation:
Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM.
RTs. 248, 250 (1998) (noting that the Constitutional Court rejected a formal understanding of
equality "which ignore[d] concrete differences in a quest for equal treatment regardless of those
differences" in favor of a definition "which [sought] to address and remedy material
inequalities"); see also Pierre De Vos, Grootboom, The Right of Access to Housing and
Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness, 17 S. AFR. J. HuM. RTS. 258, 267 (2001) ("[T]he
Constitutional Court has interpreted the right to equality to go far beyond a formal guarantee of
equal treatment .... ").
46. S. AFR. CONST. 1996§211(3).
47. See T.W. Bennett, The Equality Clause and Customary Law, 10 S. AFR. J. HuM. RTS.
122, 123 (1994) ("[C]ustomary law falls under the shadow of a bill of rights-which was given
pride of place in the Constitution-in particular under the shadow of a gender equality clause.").
48. See Bhe & Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others 2003 (1) BCLR 27 (CC) at 28-
29 (S. Aft.) (declaring unconstitutional an act of Parliament that recognized discriminatory
customary laws).
49. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 30.
50. Id. § 31.
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rights, however, may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with the
principle of equality established in § 7(1).
The Bill of Rights provides for legislation that recognizes "(i) marriages
concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law;
or (ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by
persons professing a particular religion."5' Again, however, recognition of
these systems may not conflict with the principle of equality. The Constitution
also makes provision for a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the
Rights of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities 52 and exhorts that
the composition of the Commission "broadly reflect the gender composition of
South Africa.
5 3
In addition to the substance of the rights promised in the Bill of Rights, the
interpretation of these rights by courts, tribunals, and forums must comport
with the Constitution's underlying ideals. Specifically, the Constitution
provides that "[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 54 Courts must consider
international law and may consider foreign law.5   This reference to
international law has been particularly illuminating in several human rights
cases in which the Constitutional Court has imported relevant international
principles into its reasoning.56 For example, in a case examining the issue of
violence against women, the Court analyzed at length South Africa's
international obligations to pursue equality for, and stem violence against,
women.5 7 Courts acknowledge rights and freedoms incorporated in legislation,
common law, and customary law, unless they contradict the values inherent in
the Bill of Rights.
51. Id. § 15(3)(a).
52. Id. § 185.
53. Id. § 186(2)(b).
54. Id. § 39(2).
55. Id. §39(l)(b)-(c).
56. See, e.g., State v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 413-48 (S. Afr.)
(weighing principles from foreign nations in analyzing the propriety of capital punishment); see
also Nat. Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. & Another v Minister of Justice & Others 1998 (12)
BCLR 1517 (CC) at 1534-45 (S. Aft.) (analyzing the treatment of sexual orientation under the
laws of various countries in deciding a sexual orientation discrimination case).
57. See State v Baloyi 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC) at 431-34 (S. Afr.) (referring to South
Africa's obligation under international law to stem violence against women and discussing the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Vienna
Declaration on Violence Against Women). Writing for the Court, Justice Albie Sachs describes
domestic violence as a gross violation of women's human rights. Id. at 441.
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IV. Polygamy and the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act is an important milestone on
the road to gender equality in South Africa, according parity to all marital
regimes and providing broad protection to women in customary unions. The
passage of the Act signifies another nail in the coffin of the legal dualism that
characterized colonial and apartheid South Africa, and it gives effect to the
constitutional vision of equality for all the legal systems, including indigenous
law.58 The Act repealed several laws that applied only to Africans in South
Africa, laws that typified the pernicious legacies of colonialism and apartheid. 59
The main purpose of the Act is to extend full legal recognition to
marriages conducted according to indigenous law, particularly, to improve the
position of women in those marriages and the position of children born
therein.60 If a person is a spouse in more than one customary marriage, the Act
recognizes all of those customary marriages, including those conducted prior to
passage of the Act.61 The Act clearly sets out the requirements for the validity
of a customary marriage, including a requirement that the parties to a customary
marriage not be minors and that the parties consent to the customary marriage.62
In addition, such marriage must be "negotiated and entered into or celebrated in
accordance with customary law., 63 The Act requires parental or guardian
consent where the prospective spouse is a minor and, in the absence of such
consent, allows the prospective spouse to obtain permission from the Minister
of Justice or a government official.64 The Act is unequivocal about equality
between the spouses:
A wife in a customary marriage has, on the basis of equality with her
husband and subject to the matrimonial property system governing the
marriage, full status and capacity, including the capacity to acquire assets
58. Sections 30 to 31 of the Constitution guarantee the right to cultural pluralism. See
supra text accompanying notes 49-50 (discussing the cultural protections embodied in the Bill
of Rights).
59. See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. 12 (S. Afr.) (repealing
sections of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, the Transkei Marriage Act 21 of 1978
(Transkei), the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985, and the Natal Code of Zulu
Law, Proc R151/1987).
60. See id. s. 2 (validating indigenous marriages conducted under customary law).
61. Id. s. 2(3).
62. Id. ss. 3(1)(a)(i)-(ii).
63. Id. s. 3(l)(b).
64. Id. ss. 3(3)-(4).
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and to dispose of them, to enter into contracts and to litigate, in addition to
any rights and powers that she might have at customary law.
65
Mindful of the need to protect women against unlawful property
deprivation, the Act also provides for an automatic community property
regime, but allows the spouses to enter into an antenuptial contract that
serves to regulate the matrimonial property.6 6 The Act also stipulates that a
husband in a customary marriage "who wishes to enter into a further
customary marriage with another woman" must apply for court approval of a
written contract to "regulate the future matrimonial property systems of his
marriages. ',67 All of these provisions reflect the formal commitment on the
marriges.68
part of the legislature to ensure equity for all wives in customary marriages.
The Act provides that a customary marriage can only be dissolved by a
court decree on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, protecting wives in
these marriages against desertion.69 Despite the gender equality implications
in the Act, the most contentious aspect for women advocates is the
recognition of polygamous unions. Polygamy has always been a source of
controversy in feminist legal theory.7 ° Its unequal status, namely that the
"benefit" of multiple marriages accrues only to men, as well as its symbolic
manifestation of patriarchy, is a cause for concern for advocates committed to
gender equality. 7' The drafters of the statute took account of the controversy,
but in weighing the patriarchal tendencies of the practice of polygamy against
the need to protect women and children in polygamous unions, decided to go
65. Id. s. 6.
66. See id. s. 7(2) ("A customary marriage entered into after the commencement of this
Act... is a marriage in community of property... unless such consequences are specifically
excluded by the spouses in an antenuptial contract which regulates the matrimonial property
system of their marriage.").
67. Id s. 7(6).
68. But see Mamashela, supra note 24, at 641 (cautioning that the Act's property
protections may be illusory for the majority of women).
69. See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. 8(1) (S. Aftr.) ("A
customary marriage may only be dissolved by a court or by a decree of divorce on the ground of
the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.").
70. For a comprehensive debate on the issues, see generally FEMINISM AND IsLAM: LEGAL
AND LITERARY PERSPECTIVES (Mai Yamani ed., 1996); HAIDEH MOGI-issi, FEMINISM AND
IsLAMIc FUNDAMENTALISM: THE LIMITS OF POSTMODERN ANALYSIS (1999); and Eva Brems,
Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices in Human Rights
Discourse, 19 HUM. RTs. Q. 136 (1997).
71. Polygamy has been defined as "the practice or custom according to which one man
has several wives (distinctively calledpolygyny), or one woman several husbands (polyandry),
at the same time. Most commonly used of the former." 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 59
(2d ed. 1989).
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the statutory route.72  In addition, the passage of the Act, as mentioned
previously in this Comment, was recognition of the centrality of indigenous law
in the lives of a large number of black South Africans and the need to respect a
system of law so historically marginalized. 73
Some feminist advocates have argued that because more African couples
are entering into monogamous civil marriages, the incidence of polygamy will
decline. Moreover, they have argued that as women have access to economic
opportunities, polygamy may become less attractive, especially in an
increasingly urbanized society.74 They contend:
The permeation of Western values such as individualism and the
importance attached to the notion of personal property; education;
urbanization; the dislocation of the family as a result of migrant labour; the
reduction, with the prevalence of waged work, in the significance of the
family as the site of economic relationships; the desegregation of conjugal
roles; ... have all contributed to a transformation.75
To this list of societal changes can be added the effect of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in South Africa and a renewed examination of polygamous
arrangements.76
V Obstacles to Women's Equality
Despite the several protections in the Act, the goal of equality for women
in these arrangements may indeed be elusive for women if certain structural
obstacles to gender equality continue. Some of these obstacles are implicitly
72. See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. 2(3) (S. Afr.) ("If a
person is a spouse in more than one customary marriage, all valid customary marriages entered
into before the commencement of this Act are for all purposes recognized as marriages."); id.
s. (2)(4) ("If a person is a spouse in more than one customary marriage, all such marriages
entered into after the commencement of this Act . . .are for all purposes recognized as
customary marriages.").
73. See Felicity Kaganis & Christina Murray, Law, Women and the Family: The Question
ofPolygyny in a New South Africa, in AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 116, 199 (T.W. Bennett et al.
eds., 1991) (noting that the colonial authorities regarded polygamy as "a heathen practice,
confined to the unenlightened").
74. See id. at 131 ("[C]hanges in social and economic conditions have diminished the
utility and attractiveness of polygyny, particularly in urban areas.").
75. Id.
76. See Alan Whiteside, The Economic, Social, and Political Drivers of the AIDS
Epidemic in Swaziland: A Case Study, in THE AFRIcAN STATE AND THE AIDS CRISIS 97, 110
(Amy S. Patterson ed., 2005) (noting that polygamy is a cultural practice that plays a role in the
spread of HIV).
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recognized in the Constitution, as outlined above, so that the issue is not one of
legislation, but rather of enforcement. The first obstacle to women's equality is
widespread poverty. For a large portion of the South African female
population, poverty continues to stifle the possibilities that the Constitution
promises through its extensive socioeconomic rights provisions. 77 Poverty also
contributes to the disproportionate impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on
women.78 For example, the ability to prevent HIV infection, as well as to
access treatment for HIV/AIDS, is extremely limited for women who are
economically dependent and therefore powerless.79 In addition, their
dependency and powerlessness render them unable to negotiate safe sex
practices with their partners, who may have several other sexual partners.80
The second impediment to women's equality continues to be widespread
violence, both in the public and in the private sphere.8' Although the South
African government passed legislation to deal with the problem, cultural
attitudes that fuel violence continue to abound.82 The Constitutional Court has
delivered two impressive judgments that examine violence against women and,
in both, the Court has clearly articulated the issue of violence against women as
one of gender equality.
83
77. See DEBBIE BUDLENDER, WOMEN AND POVERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA 2-3 (2003),
http://www.genderstats.org.za/documents/WomenandPoverty.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2007)
(suggesting that poverty restrains the ability of women to stand up to abuse or to assert their
rights because of economic dependence on men) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
78. See Lesley Doyal, HIV and AIDS: Putting Women on the Global Agenda, in AIDS:
SETTING A FEMINIST AGENDA 11, 17 (Lesley Doyal, Jennie Naidoo & Tamsin Wilton eds., 1994)
("The growing numbers of women with HIV and AIDS are concentrated in the poorest
countries. ... ").
79. See id. at 14-18 (suggesting that women's economic dependence on men may inhibit
their ability to prevent or treat HIV infection).
80. See id. (providing anecdotal accounts of women forced to tolerate infidelity because
of financial dependence on their husbands).
81. Notably, the South African Constitution provides for protection from such violence.
See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 2(12) (providing that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom and
security of the person, which includes the right.., to be free from all forms of violence from
either public or private sources").
82. See Penelope E. Andrews, Violence Against Women in South Africa: The Role of
Culture and the Limitations of the Law, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 425, 433, 437-39
(1999) (discussing the cultural and political causes of violence against women). Although
violence against South African women has many causes, "a significant factor has been the
traditional reluctance of the police to deal constructively with crime." Id. at 433. In addition,
the patriarchal indigenous systems of law, "which rendered women perpetual minors, always
under the tutelage of a male," left women vulnerable to violence. Id. at 439.
83. See, e.g., Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec. & Another 2001(10) BCLR 995
(CC) at 1016-17 (S. Afr.) (suggesting that the protection of women's equality requires the
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Finally, cultural attitudes generated by the range of masculinities in South
Africa continue to impede women's equality in both the public and the private
domain. These cultural patterns raise questions about the interplay of law and
culture and, particularly, how effective legal change is in the face of cultural
intransigence.84 In the final analysis, despite these many extra-legal obstacles
to women's equality, the Constitution provides a framework for challenging
such obstacles.
VI. Conclusion
The constitutional protection of women's rights, as well as the
constitutional recognition of the institutions and structures of traditional law,
involves a series of balancing tests that raise perennial questions about the role
of law in pursuing equality, as well as respect for the many ways that citizens
enjoy and practice their cultural norms and values. In South Africa, there
remains a distance between the lofty ideals of the Constitution and the reality of
people's lives. However, the evolution of a new legal culture cognizant of
underlying African communitarian values and judicious of women's rights will
be a challenging endeavor. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act
represents one of those endeavors. It may not be a panacea for all the problems
of discrimination and disadvantage that women experience in customary
marriages, but it does signify that they deserve statutory protection to ensure
equality, as mandated by the Constitution.
protection of women from violence).
84. See KRISTINA A. BENTLEY, WHOSE RIGHT IT IS ANYWAY?: EQUALITY, CULTURE AND
CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 15-19 (2003) (noting that new provisions of African law
can conflict with the norms of patriarchy).
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